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13. We have endeavored to'show from the authorities submitted, in what light generalrestraints against alienation, both
voluntary and involuntary, are regarded. The reader's attention is now invited to the consideration of those specialor par
tial restraints upon the alienation and enjoyment of estates
which are approved by the law. They usually take the form
of prohibitions or conditions against alienation for a certain
length of time, or to certain persons, or against certain uses
of the estate granted. Some of these prohibitions rest upon
the incapacity of the donee, and seem created for his or her
protection.
The authorities seem to concur in the approval of partial
iestraints ; but it is impossible to lay down any rule indicating
the length of time which may be safely covered by these restraints. Nothing more definite can be given than that the
donee may be restrained for aliening for a reasonable length
of time. A condition to an estate in fee, that the donee should
not sell until he should attain the age of twenty-five years, was
pronounced valid, and his deed made before that time declared
void: Dongal v. Frazer,3 Mo. 40. The doctrine of partial
restraints, as laid down in this case, was approved in Collins v
VoL XvrIII.-29*
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Clamorgan, 5 Mo. 273, and Collins v. Clamorgan, 6 Mo. 170.
Whether a restraint against alienation annexed to a fee simple
estate can be extended to the period of a life or lives in being,
is a question upon which the authorities are divided. It has
been said, in some cases, that such a restraint is not too general
provided it does not extend beyond the period defined as the
limit against perpetuities-that is, a life or lives in being and
twenty-one years after: Mc Williams v. Nisly, 2 S. & R. 507;
Baker v. Cobb. 36 N. H: 345; Simonds v. Simonds, 3 Mete.
562. It is certain that such a restriction is not objectionable
on the ground of violating the rule against perpetuities. There
is a distinction,however, between restraining the owner of a fee
simple estate from disposing of it during his life, and restraining the owner of a life estate from a similar disposition during
his life. In the former case the grantor retains no interest in
the estate granted and can arrogate no right to restrict its
alienation or use. In the latter case he retains the reversion
and the fee, and cannot be said to be indifferent as to the disposition and enjoyment of the land by his tenant. The better
view inclines to a disapproval of such a restriction as repugnant to the estate granted, and an unreasonable abridgment of
the right of alienation: Walker v. Vincent, 7 Harris 369;
Reifsnyd-er v. Hunter, 7 Harris 41 ; Jauretsche v. Proctor, 48
Penn. 466 ; Gleason v. Fayerweather,4 Gray 388; Rochfordv.
Hockman, 10 Eng. L. and E. 64; S. C., 9 Hare 475.
14. It must be admitted that the authorities are numerous
enough to sustain a great many partial restrictions upon the
alienation and enjoyment of estates, where they are manifestly
repugnant to the nature of the estate granted. A condition attached to a fee simple estate that the grantor should erect a
school-house, was held valid and the estates declared forfeited
by his failure to comply with the condition within a reasonable
time: Hayden v. Stoughton, 5 Pick. 528. A condition that no
window should be made in the north wall of the house, nor of
any house to be erected on the premises within twenty years,
was approved as not unreasonable: Gray v. Blanchard,8 Pick.
29-4. A condition in a conveyance to a road corporation that
tbey should seasonably maintain their road, was held valid :
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7orneliu v. Ivins 2 Dutch. 376. A conveyance on condition
that the grantee should keep a saw-mill and grist-mill doing
business on the premises, was held subject to forfeiture for nonperformance of the condition: Lessee of Sperry v. Pond,5 0.
387. Conditions that the grantee should not carry on a particular trade within a reasonable district: 2 Pieston Abs. p.
184; Cheesley v. Langley, 1 Roll. Abr. 427, or that no ardent
spirits should be kept or sold on any part of the premises: Cllins Ifanfacturing Go., furry, 25 Conn. 242 have been held
valid. It was recently held that an estate might be given on
condition that the grantee should continue to reside on the
premises and provide for the support and maintenance of the
grantor, which necessarily implied that there should be no
alienation, until the obligation of the condition was determined by release or death of the grantor: Eastman v. Batchelder, 36 N. H. 141. It has been frequently held that devises
might be made upon condition, that the devisee should not
contest the will or assert certain claims against the estate of
the testator: (ook v. Turner, 15 M. & W. 727; Chew's Appeal ,
45 Penn. 228; Rogers v. Law, 1 Black, U. S. 253; Lloyd v.
Branton, 3 Merivale 118.
15. Special restraints against the alienation ald enjoyment
af estates are frequently imposed for the benefit and protection of persons not sui Juris. They are necessarily of a limited duration, because they are imposed upon the person receiving the estate, and do not follow the fee beyond his existence. A devise to a minor, that he shall not come into possession, occupy or have advantage, except through his guardian is valid: Smithwick v. Jordan,15 Mass. 113. In the case
of married women, restraints may be imposed during coverture: 11 Jarman, Con. 552, note a, where such restrictions
are imposed in general terms, they are valid during coverture, but without effect both before and after coverture: Tullett v. Armstrong, Mylne & Cr., 390 S. C., 1 Beav. 2; Bar-.
ton v. Bristol, Jacobs, 603.
16. In England and in most of the States the creation of
separate estate in a married womau does not of itself present
any restriction against the alienation of it. The power to
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alienate and burden it is conceded as an incident of its creation, unless it is expressly withheld. Now, in respect to all
restrictions, withholding from her the power to alien and bur.
den it with her obligations, they are very generally approved
and sustained during coverture, but disapproved both before
and after coverture. During her discoverture, all such restrictions are as invalid as when attached to the estates of any
person su jurns; Woodmeston v. Walker, 2 Rus. & Myl.
197; Brown v. Pococke, 2 Rus. & MyL 210; Jones v. Salter 2

Rus. & M. 208; Newton v Reid, 4 Sim., 14; Clark v. Wyndhim, 12 Ala. 798. Thus we perceive that because the law imposes upon her, for her protection, a general restraint measured
by the duration of her coverture, the grantor is upheld in
imposing additional, reasonable restraints for her welfare and
security, during this period of her disability.
17. When special restraints contravene the policy of the law,
they are void in like manner with general restraints of a similar nature. Of this class, restraints in the nature of injunctions,
conditions and covenants against marriage, may be alluded
to. Reference is now made to only such as are known in the
law as conditions subsequent, operating upon the estate already
vested. When they are imposed upon estates given to unmarried women, they are void, unless justified by the peculiar circumstances, of the case in which they are imposed: Scott v.
taylor, 2 Brown, 0. 0. 431; Mosley v. Reynolds, 2 Hare 570;
Common v. Stouffer, 10 Barr 350; Phillipsv. Mfead, 7 Conn.
588; Parsons v. Winslow, 6 Mass. 169; Bennett v. Robinson,

10 Watts 348. But where the restriction is in the form of a
condition, imposed by the husband against the marriage of his
widow, with a forfeiture or termination of the estate resulting
from a breach, the weight of authority approves it is valid. In
other words restraints against the enjoyment of property, in the
shape of conditions against second marriages, when imposed by
the husband upon his widow, are not against the policy of the
law: Dumey v. Schaeffer, 24 Mo. 170 Craven v. Brady, Law

Rep., 4 Eq. Cas. 209 ; Vance v. Campbell, 1 Dana 229; Rogers
'.
Am. Board, 5 Allen 69; Doyall v Smith, 28 Ga. 262;
traughan v. Lovejoy, 34 Ala. 53 7; Pringlev. Durkey, 4 Smed.
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& M. In Commonw. v. Stauffer, 10 Barr, Penn. 350, Chief
Justice GIBSON adds the weight of his distinguished name to
this proposition, in an opinion eminently clear and forcible. It
is not to be inferred from these cases that this doctrine could
be invoked against the second marriage of surviving husbands.
A restraint against marriage, imposed upon the estate of a
grandson, was recently held void: Otis v. Prinu,10 Gray 581.
A condition that a legacy to a daughter should be forfeited
on her becoming a nun, was held good, although there was no
limitation over: Dickson's trust 1 Eng. L. & Eq. 595.
18. The doctrine of partial or particular restraints, as
developed in the authorities submitted, took its origin in the
Larges'case, decided by the Queen's Bench in the reign of Elizabeth: 2 Leon. 82; 3 Leon. 182. Restraints upon the assignment of leases (Dyer 6, a.; 1 And. 123, 124), and against the
pursuit of certain trades upon the premises, were of ancient
origin: Chesley v. Langley, 1 Rol. Abr. 427.
In the Larges Case the testator devised his lands to his wife
until his son William should attain the age of twenty-two years,
remainder as to a portion of. his lands to two sons, and as to
another portion, to two other sons,- upon condition that if any
of his sons should, before William reached the age of twentytwo years, sell or go about to sell his respective estate, he
should forever lose the same, in which event it was to go over
to another. Before his son William attained the age of twentytwo years, one of the sons leased his lands for sixty years, and
to and from sixty years until two hundred and forty years.
The condition was held valid, and the lease declared a substantial breach of it. This case is usually cited in support of the
doctrine of partial restraints. It is not, however, a very
pointed authority in support of subsequent conditions against
alienation. For the estate that was defeated had never vested
in possession, and the vesting was made dependent upon this
condition, which was in the nature of a condition precedent
to the full seizin of the land by the son, whose act-defeated it
before the time had arrived for its enjoyment as an estate in
possession.
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19. It must be admitted that all restraints, however partial
or particular when attached to fee simple estates vested iD
persons suijuris,are, in the logic of the law, as repugnant tc
the nature of such estates, as if they were general and coextensive with their duration, and were unreasonable and arbitrary. A restriction that the donee of a fee simple estate shali
not have the iight to sell it for a single day, is as repugnant to
the constituent elements of the estate as a condition that he shall
never dispose of it, for in the gift he is vested with the right
to alien, as much as he is vested with the land, and any condition against the exercise of this right is only an attempt to
except what has been already given. This reflection is perhaps
more easily accepted in its application to personal property,
which, on account of its perishable nature, does not afford so
convenient a subject for restraints and limitations. Where a
thing is given and then by a subsequent clause the very thing
itself is excepted, the exception is void, as repugnant to the
gift. All conditions repugnant to the absolute gift of personal
property are void: Bradley v. Peixote, 3 Yes. 324; Cathbert
v. Perrin,Jacob 415; Weatherby v. Weatherby, 13 S. & M.,
685; Barksdale v. Elam, 30 Miss. 694; Britton v. Twining,
3 Meriv. 176; Billing v.Billing, 5 Sim. 232; Ross v. Ross,

1 Jac. & W. 154. It has also been decided that restraints
against the assignment of choses in action are void. The claim
of a policy holder prior to loss may be restrained from assignmeDt for reasons inherent in the nature of the contract, which
is still executory and rests upon the confidence and trust between the parties which first gave rise to it. But after loss
it is a fixed claim and presents no reason against its unrestricted alienation: Goits v. Kat. ins. Co., 25 Barb. 189; Curtney v. N. Y. L. Ins. Co., 28 Barb. 116. A different, but, as
we think, utenable view has been taken of this proposition by
some courts: Dey v. Poughkeepsie ff. Ins. Co., 23 Barb. 623:
Hobbs v. Memphis Ins. Co., 1 Sneed 444.

Notwithstanding these objections the doctrine of particular
or partial restraints must be accepted as established by the
auth3rities. But the bounds within which it prevails are not

